But first we're going to have to rebuild it. And these plastics definitely don't want to stay in one piece. Rebuilding the Green Giant Before we get into that, however, I've previously talked at length about Apple's early 1990s server strategy as it pertained to how the Apple Network Server ended up running IBM AIX , though not much about why CEO John Sculley's Apple embarked on a server line in the first place.
Likewise, we've said very little about the parallel evolution of the Workgroup Servers and their relationship to the core Macintosh product line. Let's consider those topics now. As an upstart in the age of microcomputers, Apple never had a history of making big iron, and the emergence of its server line can actually be traced back almost directly to the failed Macintosh Office concept.
In January 1985, Apple's infamous "Lemmings" ad led its new hardware and peripherals announcement, including the AppleTalk Personal Network (what we now call LocalTalk) to set up multidrop serial links between computers and networked devices, the new LaserWriter printer, and a revamped Lisa 2/10 with more RAM and hard disk space newly subsumed into the Mac fold as the Macintosh XL. For a not completely eye-watering amount of money, Macintoshes could talk amongst themselves and send jobs to a high-quality shared printer, with network file storage on the XL's 10MB "Widget" hard disk to come shortly and support for suitably equipped PCs to follow. Steve Jobs, then both chairman of the board and veep of the Macintosh division, confidently predicted 10,000 Macintosh Office networks by the end of the year.
While the LaserWriter started at $6995 [$21,750 in 2026 dollars], the refreshed Lisa, er, Macintosh XL now started at a surprisingly competitive $3995 [$12,450], some $6000 less. " Big Mac had many vague ideas associated with it, though most of them converged on it being a file server or high-end workstation running some sort of Unix, possibly with the Macintosh interface layered on top. As such, being the most powerful machine in the constellation, it couldn't help but be fated for a central role in the new Macintosh Office.
Later in design it was also internally known as the "3M" project, because it would generate at least a megapixel display (its most famous surviving mockup even put it in portrait orientation), provide at least a megabyte of memory, and run at least a million instructions per second on the new 68020. Unfortunately for John Sculley, the company grossly underestimated the XL's appeal at its new lower price. What Apple expected to sell in eighteen months sold in three, emptying the parts inventory so rapidly that Sculley was forced to end its availability in April with Big Mac and its software still stuck in development.
) Neither could Apple keep up with demand for the LaserWriter, becoming deeply backordered from manufacturing delays and only shipping 2,500 printers by June. Third-party products ended up filling the gaps, including networking hardware from 3Com and the Centram TOPS file sharing suite. Meanwhile, the Apple board, increasingly concerned about Jobs' excesses in his dual role, ordered Sculley to contain him, after which Jobs was cashiered in May and departed in September.
Now in practical ruins, even though Apple promised all shipping products would remain available, the Macintosh Office initiative was officially shut down the same month. Big Mac sensu stricto was so identified with Jobs internally that it became a political liability in the wake of his precipitous exit. For his part, new Mac product manager Jean-Louis Gassée considered it a "toy" and wasted little time officially canning it, instead promoting the Milwaukee project which had been quietly launched without Jobs' knowledge to create the future Macintosh II.
Consequently, Apple's image began to suffer with corporate consumers as they lost confidence in the company's suitability for large office deployments. Sculley addressed this perception head-on at the 1986 introduction of the Macintosh Plus, telling attendees, "I know the real commitment from business customers must be earned by meeting customer needs, by living up to expectations and by keeping promises. " The legacy of Big Mac nevertheless persisted in the Macintosh II's development, which at one point was even codenamed "Little Big Mac," and AppleShare's tardy arrival in January 1987 finally made a basic server platform possible.
At launch AppleShare was targeted at any Macintosh Plus with sufficient external storage, though in initial versions a machine chosen for server duty had to be all but completely dedicated to the task. Introduced in March, the Mac II, compatible with the new AppleShare as well, would subsequently go on to largely achieve the 3M project's aims. 3BSD.
For this work Apple contracted with UniSoft, then on the other side of the Bay in Emeryville, and well-known in the industry for their Unix ports such as the initial operating system of the Sun-1. After the kernel and userland were largely complete, development returned to Apple to graft on the Toolbox layer, a complex undertaking that suffered from months of delays fixing bugs. 0 (amusingly codenamed "Pigs in Space" after the Muppets sketch) finally emerged at Uniforum in February 1988 and was immediately available as a special Macintosh II configuration ($8597, approximately $24,250 in 2026 dollars) or on a pre-configured 80MB hard disk with a PMMU chip and extra RAM (up to $4979, or $14,050 in 2026 dollars), plus another $650 [$1835] for the book manuals.
0's Toolbox had no MultiFinder support and could only run one GUI application at a time — and only about five to ten percent of existing Macintosh applications — the new operating system still achieved its greater purpose: credible entry to the high-end workstation market and new interest from government and educational customers who needed a Unix-based option, yet still keeping much of the Mac's secret sauce. " Users generally agreed, though it was necessary to reboot back into System 6 to run most Mac applications, and developers objected to the A/UX Toolbox's front-end limitations and un-Mac-like programming interface when building hybrid apps. While System 7's impending development continued in the background, Apple added X11 support as an option in part to address these and other deficiencies in the graphical interface.
"Our first goal was to do a solid Unix," argued Michael J. Homer, technical markets director. 0, introduced in 1990 before System 7's rollout, made good on the majority of Apple's promises: most 32-bit clean applications could now run under a new compatibility layer, MultiFinder was supported, and Macintosh, command line and X11 applications were finally able to coexist on one screen.
" Subsequently in July 1991, after System 7's May launch, Apple and IBM announced their new partnership around the PowerPC and a future AIX incorporating the Mac Toolbox . 0 at the same time. ) Despite these positive moves on the server software side, there had yet to be any corresponding server hardware , and Macs pressed into server duty in those days were otherwise just Macs.
edu ) down in the AP&M B337 lab, running AppleShare version something-or-other and an unknown Gopher server that we all accessed for software resources. I was fortunately able to save its contents before it was decommissioned, since it could still be accessed off-campus at the time. As such, Apple management concluded their persistent lack of a turnkey server configuration was harming additional institutional uptake.
At Mactivity '92, the Enterprise Systems Division (what would become Apple's Server Group) quizzed attendees for desired features; respondents nearly unanimously favoured high-end hardware on a Unix platform. Fortunately, Apple now credibly had one. In March 1993 the company announced the first Macintoshes to officially be called servers: the Workgroup Server 60, Workgroup Server 80, and Workgroup Server 95.
Of course, these machines at their core were also "just" Macs, or more specifically they were "just" Quadras: the AWS 95, the first one out of the gate in April, was a rebadged Quadra 950 (complete with the same keyswitch that debuted in the Q900), the Workgroup Server 80 was a rebadged Quadra 800, and the Workgroup Server 60 was a Centris 610 (that later became the Quadra 610). The main difference from the consumer models was that all three systems shipped with full 68040s plus extra base RAM and larger hard disks up to a full gigabyte, and true to their word, all three systems were A/UX-capable. 1, a requirement of the included high-performance PDS SCSI and L2 cache (128K to 512K) card, plus an optional 200-seat AppleShare Pro license for file and print services (a separate configuration targeted databases, with Oracle 7 specifically mentioned).
In fact, when the demo machine reportedly got stolen shortly before Mactivity93 , product manager Marv Su had to "make one" out of a Quadra 950 and a spare card to show to attendees. An optional tray could carry up to five internal hard disks, sitting on top of the system's drive shelf. While the AWS 95 could still run System 7, the PDS SCSI/L2 card was only fully supported in A/UX, and blocked one of the five NuBus slots when installed.
1, and both the AWS 95 and the AWS 80 had optional built-in DDS (DAT) tape backup. The 60 and 80 launched two months after the 95 in June; Apple started the three systems at $3079, $6399 and $7589 [$7150, $14,850 and $17,600] respectively. The most expensive AWS 95 loadout had 48MB of RAM, a 230MB and a 1GB disk drive, DDS-1 tape and 512K of L2 cache, and sold for $12,929 [$30,000].
All three servers were generally well-reviewed, though the value proposition of the two lower-end models was somewhat questionable, and their sales were correspondingly tepid. On the other hand, in certain stratospheric market niches the AWS 95 became especially prized as both a high-end Mac workstation as well as a server. With institutional customers clamouring for an even higher-performance version, Apple wanted to keep that momentum going through the transition to PowerPC.
Meanwhile, Sculley himself exceeded the Apple corporate board's collective patience (particularly over Newton, cratering sales, various failed merger talks and Apple's biggest loss in any fiscal quarter to date) and was replaced as CEO by Michael Spindler in June 1993.
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